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PREFACE

This report describes California's initial experience under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act (1976). Because of the preliminary quality of available
information 1 the report does not analyze the effectiveness of the law in meeting the
fundamental objectives of criminal sentencing. Rather, the report suggests an agenda for further research on the effects of the law. Despite its preliminary nature, the
information documented here should aid California policymakers in assessing the
success of the law and in considering appropriate changes to it. The report should
also be useful to policymakers in other states and to others interested in sentencing
reform and criminal justice research. Pursuit of research projects described in the
report would provide substantial information about California's approach to determinate sentencing.
The research described here, completed in 1979, was funded by the California
Community Release Board. The Board was renamed the Board of Prison Terms as
of January 1, 1980.
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SUMMARY

To remedy apparent injustices in criminal sentencing, a growing number of
states have adopted determinate or other structured sentencing reforms. California's determinate sentencing law is unique among those in the degree to which the
state legislature determines the details of sentencing decisions. Through the law
the California legislature not only established general sentencing policy but also
limited the variation in sentences, defined the principal bases for such variation,
and established the specific lengths of prison terms. For most crimes, judges can
still decide not to send convicted felons to prison. However, for those sentenced to
prison, judges must calculate the length of prison terms by choosing among a
narrow range of statutory options. Similarly, the law severely restricts the power
of prison or parole officials to influence the length of prison terms: only by following
elaborate due process procedures can they revoke limited amounts of good time.
This report reviews the background and objectives of the California determinate sentencing law and makes preliminary observations about its early impact
drawn from interviews and analyses of criminal justice data. It then suggests a
series of research projects designed to more fully examine some of its long-range
effects.
There have been changes in the operation of the California criminal justice
system since the July 1, 1977 effective date of the determinate sentencing
However, it is difficult to ascribe many of these shifts to the new law per se, since
it was adopted during a period of related changes both in California
nationally.
Throughout the nation, a growing proportion of
felons were being incarcerated. Federal and state courts were extending the due process rights prisoners. The California legislature passed laws imposing mandatory prison terms and
modifying the Probation Subsidy Act; California voters overwhelmingly passed
Proposition 7 increasing prison terms for homicide. California voters also passed
Proposition 13 which drastically reduced local property tax revenues, leading some
to predict that more felons would be sentenced to state rather than local
Taken together, these developments make it difficult to
changes in the criminal justice
to the determinate sentencing law or to these
events. However, we can
of the California
system in the early period of determinate sentencing and
out possible effects
of the determinate sentence law.
In general, we make the following observations:
•

•

Under the determinate sentence law, both legislators and judges are more
directly accountable to the public for sentencing decisions. It also extends
felons greater procedural protection, both at the time of sentencing and
while serving prison terms.
The determinate sentence law has not disrupted the court process. Court
personnel appear to have adjusted reasonably well to its complex provisions.

1The Rand Corporation is studying the impact of Proposition 13 on the California criminal justice
system. The results of this study are forthcoming.
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Prison commitment rates have increased substantially under the new law.
However, this continues a preexisting trend that began in 1972. Determinate sentencing may have extended this trend and stabilized it at a higher
level than might otherwise have occurred.
California faces a major problem of prison crowding. The new law's elimination of Adult Authority "safety valve" parole release powers may have
exacerbated this problem.
The average length of prison terms in the early determinate sentence
period is slightly lower than under the old indeterminate system. This may
reflect continuation of a trend that began in 1976. However, it is improper
to conclude that felons are being sentenced more leniently, because many
felons who previously would have served jail terms of at most one year are
now serving prison terms. Moreover, recent legislation has increased prison terms.
Since passing the new law, the California legislature has continued to
increase imprisonment and the length of prison terms, all of which will
further aggravate prison crowding.
The determinate sentencing law appears to have contributed to more equitable sentencing by reducing variability in the length of prison terms for
those convicted of similar crimes. However, amendments changing penalties have introduced temporal disparities, and the effect of prosecutorial
discretion on sentencing variation has not yet been definitively measured.
The new law's specification of prison terms has turned plea bargaining into
more meaningful sentence bargaining and has probably facilitated earlier
negotiated settlements of lesser felonies. This may have resulted in more
efficient allocation of judicial time. The law may also have generally increased the discretion available to prosecutors to control dispositions and
sentences causing some to warn of potential threats to achieving the law's
purposes of just and equitable punishment.
Even though the new law establishes punishment as the primary objective
of imprisonment, funds to be expended for prison treatment programs
have not been reduced.
The administrative costs of implementing determinate sentencing do not
appear high in light of the substantial costs associated with overall criminal justice administration-but the correctional costs resulting from increased commitments and penalty increases in the aftermath ofthe law are
substantial.
As anticipated, parole caseloads were substantially reduced during the
period the law placed a one-year limit on parole supervision, but caseloads
and costs have begun to climb with amending legislation that extended the
parole period to three years.
A small sample ofinterviewed inmates liked the certainty of sentences and
term lengths set up by the original law, but disliked the penalty increase
amendments. Inmates were disturbed by the process of retroactive application of the law which they saw as arbitrary.

Prison commitments per 100,000 California population rose from 32.4 in 1977
to 39.2 in 1978, the highest rate in the history of the Department of Corrections.
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There are a number
that appear to have influenced the trend toward
increased imprisonment. These include: a perception by judges and legislators that
the public favors tougher penalties; contested judicial elections in which sentencing
practices have been an issue; determinate sentencing law requirements making it
easier to monitor judicial performance; and greater willingness of defendants and
judges to accept short defined prison sentences for relatively nonserious crimes.
The continuing increase in prison population raises serious problems for the
Department of Corrections and the California legislature. Population pressures
have already required the double celling of inmates. Demographic projections
suggest that even aging of the post-World-War II "baby boom" will not avoid future
prison crowding because of migration to California of high-crime-prone young men.
In turn, excessive prison population will likely contribute to greater prison violence
and disciplinary problems. Moreover, crowded prisons invite judicial intervention,
potential restrictions on new prison commitments, or the potential return to indeterminate sentencing procedures.
Critics of the California determinate sentence law have questioned the ability
of the legislature to cope with its sentencing responsibility. The legislature's recent
actions mandating imprisonment and increasing penalties will exacerbate the problem of prison crowding. This early experience suggests the legislature may accede
to pressures for more penalty increases, despite their correctional costs.
By authorizing funds for planning prisons, acquiring new prison sites, and
studying alternatives to prison construction, the legislature has begun to address
problem of prison crowding. However, even if new facilities are constructed
they are unlikely to be available until 1986; interim measures to cope with crowding will be needed
the short term. To reduce prison crowding in the long term
the legislature faces the options of (1) reducing prison terms and commitments, (2)
increasing community release programs, or (3) increasing prison capacity-none of
which appears to be politically attractive.
An agenda for further research proposed in this report is designed to aid the
legislature in its related decisions about sentence lengths and prison construction.
Four projects would examine sentence severity under the determinate sentence law
and how well the law achieves its basic purposes of just punishment, equitable
punishment, and public protection. The research would compare the achievement
of these purposes under the determinate and indeterminate sentence laws, and
could guide modifications to the law to better achieve these purposes within the
constraints of reasonable prison costs and populations.
Additional, proposed research would examine effects of the determinate sentence law on prison programs and prison discipline to aid the Department of Corrections and the legislature in decisions about prison policies. Two studies would
examine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
the determinate sentence
law and document how court practices under the law limit the legislature's intended changes in sentencing policies. These studies could aid the legislature designing modifications to the determinate sentence law to assure that its basic objectives
are
decisions about the determinate sentence
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all of these
scribe how California's criminal justice system is
determinate sentence law. To complete this description, the report proposes a multiple-year
study of the legislature's actions affecting determine sentencing and prisons. Because of the central role of the legislature under the determinate sentence law, this
project would serve as the important central focus of a description ofthe California
experience.
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I.

This report presents observations about California's initial experience under
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act. 1 It also identifies researchable issues and
a research strategy that will help California policymakers and others assess the
impact ofthe new law. Current research under way on the California DSL is also
described.
The California DSL is part of a national trend in sentencing, moving away from
reliance on a "medical model" in which the length of incarceration is based on
individual "needs" and rehabilitation toward a system designed more to promote
equity, procedural fairness, and just punishment. Presently, Indiana, Illinois, Arizona, Alaska, and North Carolina have adopted varying forms of determinate
sentencing. 2 The growing shift toward determinate sentencing has stimulated
widespread national interest in the initial experience of these states.
report
draws together existing information about what has
in
since
the DSL was adopted. It then
a series of research proposals that are
derived from our review of
experience under

BACKGROUND
placed
in the
and
Women's Board ofTerms

1.

prison walls.
1
Chapter 1139 of the Statutes of 1976 as amended. The determinate sentence law is referred to
throughout the California criminal
either as the initials or as
"diesel." The indeterminate sentence
is
as the initials
or as "ice!." We follow these conventions
2
Maine also
a sentencing law that
as
feature of
decisions-a feature that is
states such as Minnesota,
and ~-'""'"Q'""0
commissions
to achieve some of

2

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

Martinson concluded that, in general, rehabilitation efforts had little impact on reducing future criminal behavior. 3
Methods to predict individual post-release behavior could not be justified
by scientific evidence. 4 Norval Morris concluded it was simply beyond our
technical capability to predict dangerousness. Others pointed out that
behavior within prisons has not correlated well with recidivism. 5
Prison terms varied widely for inmates committing similar offenses. 6
The uncertainty of prison terms permitted arbitrary actions by correctional and parole board officials, fostered prison unrest, encouraged "gaming"
to convince the parole board that release was warranted,' and reputedly
diminished the deterrent effect of a prison sentence.
Parole supervision was questioned as a means to rehabilitate parolees or
to protect society. In general, parole agent/parolee contact was found to
be too limited and superficial to produce either ofthese results. 8 Research
study results did not show conclusively that supervision successfully
reduced recidivism or provided effective services. 9
Basic decisions about sentencing policy were being made by the courts in
cases challenging Adult Authority actions. 10 This determination of
sentencing policy through judicial review of individual cases prevented
development of comprehensive and consistent sentencing policies. 11

The mounting attacks on the basic assumptions of the ISL during the early
1970s paved the way for fundamental change. The legislature adopted new sentencing procedures based on very different philosophical premises. Sentencing responsibility was shifted from the broad discretionary power of appointed boards to
highly structured and limited decisions by trial judges.
Under the new system of determinate sentencing, imprisonment has the explicitly stated objective of punishment under procedures designed to assure more just,
uniform sentencing practices. The legislature has assumed direct control of sentencing, establishing definite terms for specified crimes. The legislation requires judges
to determine the length of prison terms by selecting among defined ranges and to
state reasons for selected sentences. The legislation eliminated the Adult Authority
and Women's Board, replacing them with the Community Release Board 12 which
has circumscribed sentencing discretion (i.e., term fixing for life sentences,
decisions about good time, waiver of parole supervision) and a new responsibility
to review sentencing disparity. Table 1 compares the major legal provisions of the
indeterminate and determinate sentencing laws.
3

Martinson (1975).
Morris (1974); Monahan (1978).
5
Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975).
6
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
The Courts (1967); Frankel (1973).
7
See Mitford (1973).
8Stanley (1976).
9
von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1978).
10
In re Lynch 8 C. 3d 410, 503 P. 2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); In re Stanley o4 C. A. 3d 1030,
126 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976); In re Rodriguez 14 C. 3d 639, 537 P. 2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
11
Johnson and Messinger (1977); Cassou and Taugher (1978).
1
2'fhe Community Release Board was renamed the Board of Prison Terms as of January 1, 1980.
Throughout this report we will use the name that was applicable during the period reviewed in the
report.
4
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Table 1
COMPARISON OF INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE SENTENCE LAWSa

Item

ISL

DSL

Primary purpose of
imprisonment

Rehabilitation

Punishment

Offenses included

All felonies

Excludes serious crimes resulting
in life terms (principally firstdegree murder).

Sentence determination

Courts decide whether to imprison.

Courts decide whether to imprison.

Legislature sets wide range of
prison terms.

Legislature sets narrow range of
prison terms and increments for
aggravated cases.

Parole Boards set length of
prison and parole terms.

Courts use legislated ranges and
increments to set length of
sentence.
Good time can reduce sentence by
up to one-third.
Community Release Board sets
length of sentence for lifers.

Sentence review

No public statement of reasons
for sentence decision.

Public statement of reasons for
sentence decision.

Parole Boards determine sentencing policy within wide ranges
set by the legislature.

Legislature sets sentencing policy.

Appellate Court (cruel and unusual punishment)

Appellate Court (cruel and unusual
punishment)
Community Release Board reviews
parity of sentences.

Parole

Inmate's procedural
rights

Parole Boards are Adult Authority and Women's Board of Terms
and Paroles.

Parole Board is Community Release
Board (now renamed Board of Prison
Terms)

Parole Boards set length within
ranges set by legislature.

Parole limited to one year (amended
to three years).

Parole Boards determine revocations.

Community Release Board determines
revocations.

Corrections' policy subject to
requirements of court decisions.

Legislatively established system of
hearings and appeals with right to
representation.

aThis table includes only major provlslons and does not reflect changes in the behavior of criminal
justice agencies (i.e., charging and plea bargaining by prosecutors and the "safety valve" role of the
parole board in limiting prison population).

4

the legislature passed the
Northern California, the Prisoners Union, and other liberal
law because it provided inmates with certain release dates
groups supported
and equitable sentencing, and
institutional control over inmates. Law
enforcement and conservatives were dissatisfied with judicial decisions that reformulated sentencing policy and Adult Authority actions they saw as prematurely
releasing dangerous offenders. They favored legislative determination of penalties,
sentencing and increased prison
believing this would result in more
terms.l 3 While different interest groups supported the change for different reasons,
the law embodied several primary objectives:
Just Punishment - Section 1170 of the Penal Code provides:
The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate
to the seriousness of the offense.
2. Sentencing Equity - Persons who ,._v,_uu.u
similar
suffer similar
provides specified
sentences intended to reduce ""''·'~'C''-'"'-"-'1'5 disparity and provide offenders
date.
3.
1.

4.

5.

6.

13

and

For a discussion of the

of the
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OF

LEGISLATION

The original DSL (SB 42) passed
1976 was due to go into effect on July 1,
1977. 14 Before that date, however, it was amended in several important ways by AB
476. It was again substantially amended in 1978 by SB 709 and SB 1057. The major
DSL provisions, as amended, are summarized below.

The Legislature and Sentencing Policy
Rather than leave discretion to the Adult Authority for setting prison terms
within wide ranges, the legislature has defined lower, middle, and upper prison
terms for specified offenses (Table 2). Subsequent legislation (SB 709) substantially
increased middle and upper terms for violent felonies (Table 2). The legislature also
determines the lengths and conditions for imposing "enhancements" that lengthen
terms.

Table 2
PRISON TERMS,

ORIGINAL

DSL

AND AS

BY

SB 709

(in years)

Offense
Second degree murder
Voluntary manslaughter
Rape
Robbery
Arson
Burglary, first degree
Burglary, second degree
Assault with deadly weapon
Vehicle theft
Forgery
Sale of narcotics
Possession of narcotics for sale
Possession of narcotics

ISL Term
(before 7/1/76)
5-life
mo-15
3-life
5-life
2-20
5-life
1-15
6 mo-life
6 mo-10
1-14
5-life
5-15
2-10

Original
DSL Terma
5,6,7
2,3,4
3,4,5
2, ,4
2,3,4
2,3,4
16 mo,2,
2,3,4
16 mo,2,3
2,3,4
3,4,5
2 ,3,4
,2,3

Term After
SB 709a

5,7,
2,4,6
3,6,8
2,3,5
2,4,6
2,4,6
2,3,
2,3,
2,3,4
2,3,4
3,4,5
2 '3,4
16 mo,2,

show lower, middle, and upper prison terms, respectively.
b

Changed to indeterminate sentence by state initiative.

709 permits great bodily injury enhancement, unavailable under the
original DSL.

..._,...,..u<•JO.~'" in Sentencing

The judge first chooses between a
or probation sentence. If the judge
decides on a
sentence, the defendant must be sentenced to the middle term,
14
Legislation is described by the bill number, with AB indicating a bill first introduced in the Assembly and SB a bill first introduced in the Senate.
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unless there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances justifying the upper or
lower term.
Enhancements for a specific term of years may be added to the base term. Facts
calling for enhancement may either relate to the specifics of the crime (e.g., use of
weapon or firearm, great bodily injury) or to other crimes (e.g., prior prison terms
or consecutive sentences). These facts must be pled and proved. There are specified
limits on enhancements that constrain base term increases.l5
Sentences are imposed during a public sentencing in which the judge must
consider factors pertinent to various sentencing decisions. Attorneys can offer
arguments or testimony during those hearings. In imposing a sentence, the judge
must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council, which include general
criteria to guide sentencing decisions, and the judge must state reasons for sentencing decisions.t6
All prison sentences are to be reviewed by the Community Release Board for
disparity within one year. At any time either the Board or the Director of Corrections may recommend that a case be recalled and resentenced. The sentencing
judge may refuse to recall and/ or sentence. The Community Release Board sets the
term for prisoners who are not sentenced determinately (i.e., lifers).

Changes in Parole
Initially, the DSL limited parole for almost all inmates to a maximum of one
year, with violators subject to return to prison for a period up to six months. Life
termers were subject to a three-year parole period. However, SB 1057 amended the
DSL, increasing the maximum parole period for DSL sentenced offenders to three
years and for life terms to five years and extending the revocation period to one
year.
Continuation ofDSL parole beyond a year and lifer parole beyond three years
must be justified by a finding of "good cause" by the Community Release Board.
Under the DSL, parole is not considered a continuation of the sentence but a period
"tacked on" to the term. The new law defines the purposes of paroles as (1) "supervision of and surveillance of parolees" and (2) the provision of services "to assist
parolees in the transition between imprisonment and discharge." 17

"Good Time"
DSL prison terms may be reduced by a total of one-third for good time. Good
time is automatic unless it is taken away in limited increments for misbehavior or
failure to participate in work or programs. 18 For a twelve-month period an inmate
can lose a maximum of three months for misbehavior including assault, escape,
inciting "successful" riots, falsifying records, possession of weapons and drugs.
15
For example, the total term cannot exceed double the base term unless there is a violent crime or
other specified circumstances (Penal Code Section 1170.1 (f)).
16
California Rules of Court, Title 2, Div. 1A, rules 410, 414, 416.
17 Penal Code Section 3000.
18Defined categories of misbehavior result in loss of credits of 45, 30, or 15 days for each activity,
with losses up to 30 days for failure to participate.

7

During a twelve-month period an inmate can lose 30 days for nonparticipation.
Good time that is not lost during a period becomes vested and cannot later be lost.
Detailed due process and appeal procedures govern loss of good time.

Retroactive Application
A felon is sentenced under the DSL only if his conviction offense was committed
on or after the effective date ofthe law, July 1, 1977. However, the law was applied
retroactively, setting a maximum DSL date for all inmates serving indeterminate
sentences. To determine the retroactive DSL date, the Community Release Board
applied provisions of the DSL to facts that were proven during conviction.
Although the law sets out a mechanical method for estimating the term, the
Board can hold an extended term hearing for dangerous offenders. The Board also
sets an ISL release date, and felons are released on whichever is earlier-the ISL
or DSL date.

Other Institutional Changes
The DSL sets up the nine-member Community Release Board which has jurisdiction to set terms for indeterminate sentences. The Board has responsibility for
retroactive application of the law; for reviewing prison sentences for disparity; for
determining parole revocation, discharge, and extension; and for hearing appeals
to Department of Corrections' denials of "good time." The Adult Authority and
Women's Board of Terms and Parole were eliminated.
The Judicial Council was mandated to formulate sentencing rules, publish data,
conduct sentencing institutes, and make recommendations to the legislature. Sentencing rules for the Superior Court were adopted effective July 1, 1977. These
rules describe the objectives of sentencing, criteria for various sentencing decisions,
and procedures for imposing sentences. 19 The Judicial Council reviews data on
determinate sentencing in California and other states in its Sentencing Practices
Quarterly.
Overall, the new law makes important changes in forums of decisionmaking,
shifting discretion away from the parole board to the legislature, the court, and the
prosecutors.

Exemptions
The DSL has no specific effect on judges' decisions to suspend sentence or to
place a defendant on probation; it does not affect misdemeanants.
Felons sentenced to death or serving life sentences are exempt from provisions
that affect liarole hearings and the length of parole supervision. Prisoners receiving
life sentences for homicide or other serious offenses are not covered by the DSL;
their terms are fixed by the Community Release Board under ISL provisions.
19
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II. INITIAL EXPERIENCE UNDER THE DSL

The DSL caused a number of important changes in the sentencing process. The
law explicitly restructured the role of the legislature, the judges, and the parole
board in setting policy and determining the sentence for individual offenders.
Changes under the DSL appear to substantially increase the role of prosecutors in
determining sentences.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SENTENCING
An important aspect of the DSL was the legislature's assumption of responsibility for setting prison terms for specified offenses. Several interviewees who had
participated in DSL negotiations stated that influential legislators restored this
responsibility to the legislature primarily because of their dissatisfaction with
Adult Authority actions.
One reason law enforcement and prosecutor groups supported this change was
because they believed that the legislature would set higher penalties in response
to public demands. The criminal defense bar and some liberal legislators opposed
this expanded legislative sentencing role because they feared that public outrage
about atypical, heinous crimes would result in penalties that were too high. However, inmate groups expressed their willingness to give the legislature direct control over sentencing policy in order to get rid of the Adult Authority.
On the other hand, people outside the California criminal justice community
who were interested in determinate sentencing criticized this central role of the
legislature, which they saw as too susceptible to popular passions and pressures. 21
It was suggested that the legislature would consider the interests of the majority
of their constituents who were concerned with public protection and demanded
harsher penalties, rather than the rights of the unpopular minority directly
affected by their actions. 22 Furthermore, the legislature was seen as having little
time or expertise to develop a rational sentencing system that would require
continuing adjustments and fine tuning.z3
At this time, three years after the DSL was adopted, we have some limited
experience to judge the sentencing responsibility exercised by the California legislature. Sentencing levels under the DSL were almost immediately amended twice.
Even before the DSL became effective, AB 476 significantly increased "enhancements" and made important technical and other changes, and only one year later
the legislature adopted SB 709, which increased penalties for violent crimes (Table
21

Gettinger (1977).
Twentieth Century Fund (1976), pp. 121-124, and von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1978), pp. 29-31.
23
Ibid.

22 See

10
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2). These penalty increases were supported by law enforcement officials led by
district attorneys. 24
Despite rapid increases in sentence levels, Senator Presley, who authored SB
709 and SB 1057, predicted that few further increases would affect a great number
of crime categories because the DSL's major weaknesses were corrected. He favored giving the law a chance to work. While he foresaw the introduction of bills
to increase penalties and the enactment of some in response to popular will, he
believed the legislature would guard against "emotionalism" and would not pass
unwise penalty increase bills. 25
Through our interviews we have looked at recent actions of the legislature to
see if, as Presley suggested, the legislature would responsibly exercise its direct
control over sentencing policy.
The legislature's actions on sentencing are affected by the actions and relative
influence of interest groups that take positions on penalty legislation. In general,
this legislation pits defense and civil libertarian groups-such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, public defenders, the American Friends Service Committee, and groups representing prisonersagainst law enforcement groups such as the California District Attorneys Association, the California Peace Officers Association, and the Attorney General. Judicial
groups have been only slightly involved. The Association of Judges has generally
not taken positions on penalty bills; the Judicial Council has taken positions only
on matters affecting the structure of the judiciary, generally opposing bills like
mandatory penalties that limit judicial discretion.
Legislative struggles between these interest groups have taken place primarily
in the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee.
The actions of these committees are influenced not only by the positions of interest
groups, but also by the ideology of committee members; the positions oflegislative
leaders, the Governor, the Attorney General, and other party leaders; committee
members' perceptions of voter attitudes in their districts; and their relative immunity from political pressures (i.e., how "safe" is their district).
In general, the Senate Judiciary Committee is regarded as more responsive to
law enforcement than the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee which for many
years refused to pass most measures that would have increased penalties.~6
However, members and staff interviewed who have been involved in criminal
justice matters believe that the legislature, in recent years, has become more
supportive of"law and order" measures, making it more difficult for the Assembly
Criminal Justice Committee to kill penalty increase measures. As one interviewee
put it: "Politically it's never bad to increase penalties. With assumption of sentenc24
A special advisory committee of judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials set up to assess the
new law drew the conclusion that the law needed modification. Report of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee to Assess the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, undated. SB 709 was sponsored
by a coalition of district attorneys.
25
Also, it was reported that district attorneys from the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, and San
Francisco areas pledged not to back further penalty increase measures ifthe legislature acted favorably
on SB 709. See Sacramento Union, April 17, 1979.
26
The Chairman of the Assembly committee saw "law and order" bills as receiving "little review"
in the Senate because the Senate Judiciary Committee was overworked handling both civil and criminal
law and because the Senators knew bad bills could be more carefully scrutinized and probably killed
in the Assembly. See San Francisco Examiner-Chronicle, August 26, 1979. See also Sacramento Bee,
September 4, 1979, where two former Chairmen of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee similarly
describe the role of the legislative committee handling criminal justice measures in each House.

12

pressure to raise sentences.
to one state .,,._,,_...
_.,VVA

Public attitudes have gotten tougher over the last five
I
been
get-tough view.
in the Senate and the legislature that has responded to
The people are tired of violent crime and want the legislature to "do somedoesn't
what to do to solve the crime
thing" about The
at rehabilitation. The
problem and is frustrated with unsuccessful
only
we can
is raise penalties. Some tough bills
get votes now they would not
years ago.
Legislators' perceptions of tougher
apparently
predate the DSL, but greater sentencing
accountability
resulting from the
seem to make resistance to increased penalties more difficult.
district attorneys and law enforcement have been successful in
the DSL.
most recent

"''The so-called
16-year minimum "'"'HL'""~"
sentence
second

13

pressure
measures to
penalties
offenders and sex offenders. To
more stringent
legislation, the Criminal Justice Committee approved a bill (AB
authored by
one ofits own liberal members, Assemblyman John Knox (D-Richmond), that would
have permitted prison
to keep apparently dangerous inmates indefinitely if the state could prove every two years that they could not be safely
This bill was adopted rather than a tougher, Republican-backed measure that
required life imprisonment without possibility of parole
20 years for "three-time
convicted
violent crimes. (However, the Assembly had been only five
votes shy of the majority necessary to discharge this tougher bill from
committee and send it directly to the
its passage, AB 29 was vetoed by
Governor Brown as unworkable and too expensive. 29
A more
sponsored by Senator H.
Richardson (Rthe Assembly
threats to remove it
'"'c'u"u;:, to its eventual pasterms for each

law enforcement may be introduced in 1980
this
1979. The
amendment was to eliminate the
definition
as well
31 Sacramento

Bee,
Sacramento Bee,
33Sacramento Bee,

·"'"''t<>rnh,n·

32

S~>r;tprnh<>r

Sentinel,

1979.

14

report out "law and order" bills. 34 When SB 13 was reported out by the committee
the ACLU lobbyist called it the "demise" of the committee's "historical function of
trying to impose some kind of rationality on criminal justice legislation." 35 Senator
Richardson said the vote represented a change in committee attitudes reflecting
the changing mood of the people. 36 Recent history suggests that the committee may
come under increasing partisan attack, and growing pressure to report out more
penalty increase bills may be difficult to withstand. Concern about the inability of
the legislature to withstand political pressures affecting its sentencing decisions in
the wake of its actions on SB 13 has prompted the Chairman of the Criminal Justice
Committee to support a legislative study of the DSL that includes examination of
the alternative of a Sentencing Commission. 37
The increasing prison population and the proposals to increase penalties have
prompted the legislature to pay greater attention to correctional costs and needs.
In a then highly unusual move, SB 709, which increased prison sentences, was
re-referred from the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee to the Assembly Ways
and Means Committee to permit consideration of its cost impact. 38 This was after
the Department of Corrections initially opposed the bill on cost grounds. The bill
was significantly amended in the Ways and Means Committee. The nature ofWays
and Means consideration of the bill is disputed. Most of our interviewees suggested
that Ways and Means Committee members did not closely examine the cost-benefit
of increased incarceration of offenders because experience under the DSL was too
limited to yield data on its initial impact and because they were influenced by a
desire to support "law and order." It was also suggested that, to the extent cost was
considered at all, it was looked at as a bill that would not come due for several years,
and envisioned as minor in the context of a $16 billion budget. Other interviewees
commented that important ehanges to reduce penalties were, at least in part, a
result of Department of Corrections estimates of SB 709's effect on prison
population and associated costs. SB 13 was also opposed by the Department of
Corrections on cost grounds, but was favorably considered by legislative fiscal
committees.
Regardless of whether costs were an important factor in legislative deliberations on SB 709 or SB 13, the legislature has been willing to examine correctional
needs and may have at least begun to cope with the problem of the increasing
prison population. Early in 1978 the legislature contracted for an independent
study of Department of Corrections population projections, facilities, and prison
classification along with alternate modes ofincarceration. 39 After the passage ofSB
709 in 1978, the legislature provided funds for planning and renovation to
accommodate the increased prison population (SB 1342). SB 196 approved in 1979
provided the Department of Corrections with funds for new prison design and site
acquisition earlier deleted by the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee and
established a citizens commission to supervise and report on three studies

34

Sacramento Bee, September 4, 1979.
Sacramento Bee, August 30, 1979; Palo Alto Times, August 30, 1979.
36
lbid.
37
SB 196 (1979) provides for a study evaluating and making recommendations on the desirability of
a Sentencing Commission.
38
Reference of penalty increase bills to fiscal committees has since become more commonplace.
39
Approach Associates, California legislature's Study of Correctional Needs, June 1978.
35
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exammmg (1) population, capacities, and housing alternatives w:ithin the
Department of Corrections, (2) alternatives to correctional placement for convicted
felons, and (3) comparisons of ISL, DSL, and sentencing commissions in meeting
criminal justice objectives. However, the legislature refused to provide the $100
million reserve fund for prison construction which officials claim is needed because
of legislation increasing penalties.
With the passage of the DSL, the legislature took greater control over determining sentences and prison population. Its recent actions show a tendency to
increase penalties in response to public and political pressures, and an apparent
reluctance to explicitly consider cost as an important factor influencing its actions
on penalty increases. Rather, it has chosen to deal with costs later and separately
as a budgetary matter. Moreover, it appears that many of the politically active
groups supporting penalty increases do not necessarily support new prison construction.
The central issue facing the legislature is how to cope with the problem of rising
prison population and prison crowding which has resulted in part from its own
sentencing decisions.
To reduce long term prison crowding the legislature has the options of either
(1) reducing prison terms and commitments, (2) increasing community release
programs, or (3) increasing prison capacity, none of which appear politically attractive.
Even if new prisons are constructed, additional beds are unlikely to be available
until 1986. Thus, interim measures are needed to cope with short-term crowding.
Driven by increases in population, the legislature has provided funds for correctional planning and site acquisition, but as yet has been unwilling to provide funds for
new prison construction. How well the legislature is able to handle both its expanded sentencing responsibility under the DSL and the problem of prison crowding
remains to be seen. Early experience suggests that the legislature may well have
difficulty withstanding pressures for piecemeal changes in the penalty structure
which in turn may raise questions about the rationality of its sentencing policies
and may exacerbate the problem of prison crowding.

THE COURT PROCESS
The DSL substantially changed courtroom procedures for determining sentences and also set policy for the sentences to be imposed. The DSL imposes a more
structured procedure for calculating sentences and greater formality for sentencing
in open court. Under both the ISL and DSL, sentences are imposed during a
separate sentence hearing, but this hearing is defined somewhat more formally
under the DSL. In addition to permitting arguments, if either side has cited circumstances in support of an aggravated or mitigated sentence prior to the hearing, the
court must receive evidence offered about such motions. The court must reach a
decision for all pertinent sentencing choices under the DSL and must also state
publicly the reasons for sentencing decisions. For felons sentenced to prison, judges
must determine the sentence length by selecting one of three legislatively determined penalties for each conviction offense. If facts that require an enhancement
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Overall, there is a general recognition that the DSL makes the bargaining
process easier and more meaningful. The parties can typically bargain over a set
of alternative dispositions offering fairly fine differences in the level of punishment. Sentence bargains are apparently facilitated by this flexibility in choices, as
well as by the certainty that the agreed upon sentence will in fact be carried out.
In particular, defendants appear to be willing to agree to a bargained sentence if
they know that the punishment cannot be increased. Data indicate that many cases
are being disposed of more quickly. Attorneys and judges identify those more
readily settled cases as those involving the least serious offenses. If so, this suggests
that the DSL may have accomplished a more desirable use of courtroom resources
-ready disposition of minor cases, permitting more thorough consideration of
serious cases.

Table 3
TIME OF GUILTY PLEAS IN SuPERIOR CouRT AS PERCENT OF
CAsEs REACHING SuPERIOR CouRT

1975

1976

1977

1978

At arraignment

21

24

24

33

After arraignment

49

50

51

43

70

74

75

76

Total
SOURCE:

Bureau of Criminal Statistics.

Many interviewees observed that this power of prosecutors entails the greatest
potential threat to equitable sentencing. Critics of determinate sentencing suggest
that prosecutors' exercise of broadened discretions will make it impossible to
achieve more equitable sentencing. 44 They allege that expanded plea bargaining
power (i.e., through decisions to charge enhancements or recommend mitigating
circumstances) will permit prosecutors to obtain convictions on
evidence; that
prosecutors' willingness to bargain away charges or enhancements to avoid trials
will formalize the disparity in sentencing between felons who plead guilty and those
who go to trial; that variations in prosecutorial practices will produce greater
disparity among felons convicted from different areas.
Some critics also suggest that prosecutors will be able to abuse their broadened
discretion since, unlike judges, they are not required to publicly disclose reasons
for their bargaining decisions. Moreover, recent legislation increasing penalty levels increases the bargaining strength of prosecutors. Judicial sentencing decisions
are constrained by the DSL sentencing
the Sentencing Rules for Superior
Courts, and the requirement to publicly state reasons
sentence choices.
sentencing decisions are also constrained by prosecutorial decisions-judges can
only select among sentencing options proved by prosecutors. However, prosecutori44

Alschuler (1978).
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al decisions about filing or negotiating are substantially unconstrained by statutory
or regulatory structures and need not be publicly justified. Unfortunately, at this
time there is no available information about how prosecutors use their discretion
or the effects of prosecutorial discretion on sentence equity.

The Judges
Some critics oppose the DSL because of its sentencing complexity and suggest
that judges would find its provisions too difficult to implement. Trial court judges
received training on the law through sentencing seminars. As a result, most judges
apparently can work within the technical complexities of the law. Department of
Corrections personnel report that while the first sentences under the law were
often calculated improperly, now relatively few sentences have such problems.
Most dispositions are still determined by negotiations. Under the DSL, judges
continue to differ in their involvement in the plea/sentence bargaining process.
Some judges report becoming directly involved in sentence negotiations with the
defense and prosecution. 45 Other interviewed judges report they will not enter
directly into negotiation processes. 46 Frequently, the parties will negotiate only a
guilty plea and agree that the case will result in a prison sentence, but they will
leave the length of the sentence up to the judge. Bargains for a plea without a
specified sentence seem to reflect both the increased power of the judge in actually
determining the sentence independently of a bargain and the increased power of
the prosecutor who can obtain an agreement to prison sentence without having to
stipulate to the length of that sentence.
Because of the increased importance of the conviction offense in determining
the sentence, judges may be rejecting more negotiated pleas. Without the Adult
Authority to "look past" the conviction offense and base sentences on the real
nature of the crime, the conviction offense now becomes more significant, determining the actual prison sentence. As a result, some prosecutors observed greater
judicial scrutiny of negotiated settlements.
The DSL mandated the Judicial Council to develop sentencing rules and criteria about granting or denying probation; imposing lower or upper terms; imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences; and adding to sentence length for
enhancement such as a prior prison term, carrying a deadly weapon, or inflicting
great bodily injury. The resulting Judicial Council Rules provide guidance on factors to be considered in sentence determination, but they have been criticized as
being "so broad and flexible that retention oftotal discretion in the judiciary is the
clear effect."47
Some interviewees suggested that the reasons provided by judges for their
sentencing decisions either are "boilerplate" or otherwise provide little informa4
5'fhese judges report mediating sentences between both parties, e.g., the judge may send a defendant
charged with second degree murder to prison because of the prosecutorial interest in the case. However,
the judge may accept a plea to manslaughter and sentence under the lower term in order to obtain the
defense agreement to the sentence.
46
With these judges, the prosecution and defense may enter into a negotiated sentence which the
judge is free to reject. However, if the judge rejects the negotiated sentence, defendants can withdraw
their offer to plead guilty.
47Smith and Newcomb (1977).
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tion that would form the basis for systematic review of the true factors governing
sentence determinations. As of now there has been no systematic analysis ofjudges'
written sentencing reasons. However, appellate courts have reviewed reasons given for sentences, reversing cases where the reasons are inconsistent with the DSL
or Sentencing Rules.

Probation Departments
Probation departments apparently have come to play a more important role in
the sentencing process through their preparation of the presentence investigation
(P&S) reports describing the results of their investigation of the circumstances and
background of particular cases. 48 There is a universal recognition that P&S reports
have been changed substantially under the DSL because they are more pertinent
to sentencing determination. 49
The role of the P&S report in the sentencing decision appears to vary between
cases that have been tried and those that have not. Judges indicate that when they
have tried a case they use relatively little information from P&S reports, drawing
principally upon information about prior record. Some interviewed judges and
prosecutors were critical of the quality of the P&S report, claiming the quality has
deteriorated since the passage of Proposition 13. The content ofP&S reports apparently has changed, with more emphasis on facts of the crime and a defendant's prior
record and less emphasis on a defendant's background and social circumstances.
Probation offices also frequently calculate suggested sentences and cite sentencing
factors in the Judicial Council Regulations that pertain to the particular case.
Defense attorneys indicated increased attempts to provide input for P&S reports,
while prosecutors reported little involvement in the preparation of the reports.
Because of the evidentiary nature of the P&S report, probation officers in some
counties are being called more often to testify during sentencing hearings. 50

Sentence Hearings
Interviewees all agree that attorneys rarely use sentencing hearings to present
evidence about sentence choices. As one judge said, the P&S report serves as a
sentencing hearing. However, a few private attorneys are using it in an attempt
to obtain more favorable sentences for their clients. This introduces the possibility
that resources available to a defendant and his attorney may substantially influence the quality of sentencing hearings, and therefore the nature of the sentence.
This could introduce economic bases of disparity in sentencing.
48
When a referral from the court is received, the probation department looks into the facts of the
case and develops pertinent factual, social, and psychological information.
49
Also, under AB 469, P&S reports must now contain statements by victims.
50
As a result, there has been some shift toward defining special court probation officers who testify
in cases whether or not they prepared the presentence report. This reflects the conclusions on the part
of some probation administrators that ordinary probation officers were "torn apart" during sentencing
hearings. Although there apparently has been a substantial increase in the frequency of probation
officers' testimony during sentencing hearings, such testimony still occurs in relatively few cases.
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Incarceration
Since the effective date of the DSL, more convicted defendants are being incarcerated in prison than previously. However, it is unclear whether the recent commitment increases can be attributed to effects of the DSL. Prison commitments
began to rise before the DSL, and several data sets differ about whether the
increase is greater since the DSL came into effect.
California Department of Corrections (CDC) data show a dramatic rise in the
number of male felons received from the court after the effective date of the DSL.
Male felon prison commitments per 100,000 California population rose from 32.4
in 1977 to 39.2 in 1978, the highest recorded rate in the history of the Department
of Corrections (Fig. 1).51 The Corrections data show steady increases in commitment
rates since 1972, but in 1978 there is a discontinuity in this steady pattern with the
1978 rate showing a substantially greater increase than for any previous year.
45r-----------------------------------------,---~

70

71

73
Year

SOURCE: California Department of Corrections, Program and Facilities
Planning Report, March 15, 1979

Fig. 1-Prison commitment rate per 100,000 population (CDC data)

51
The first year that commitments show the major effect of the DSL is 1978, since 62 percent of
'"""nrn"'""ofCorrections commitments in this
were made under the new law. In 1977 there were
the July 1 effective date.
few DSL commitments, 13 percent
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Table 4
PRISON CoMMITMENTS AS PERCENT OF SuPERIOR CouRT CoNVICTIONSa

Prison Commitments
(percent of convictions)
Item
State total, all crimes

9/30/77a

12/31/ 77a

3/31/78a

6/30/78a

9 I 30/78a

27

30

33

33

33

56
25
37
26

61
30
37
30

64
26
39
31

62
34
42
32

63
24
47
34

20
19
28
24
21
22
35
22
17

21

26
33
28
22
26
43
29
21

20
27
37
22
23
32
48
31
24

23
28
33
15
24
33
49
31
24

26
36
37
22
20
40
41
32
26

Selected crimes:
Robbery
Assault with deadly weapon
Burglary, first degree
Burglary, second degree
Grand theft, amount over $200 and
unspecified
Grand theft (auto) and vehicle theft
Forgery
Checks (NSF)
Receiving stolen property
Possession of narcotics
Possession of narcotics for sale
Sale of narcotics
All drug law violations

Sentencina
aFor quarter ending this date.

~

24

18

Determinate
Sentenced
3-14 days
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16
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7
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15-30

4
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75-76
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SOURCE: los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
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along with short
received straight probation terms. Increases in local
of
DSL prison sentences, apparently reflect a
sentences for less serious crimes.
In short, all of these data suggest that the incarceration rate in California has
increased since 1972 and continues to increase under the DSL. These trends indicate that the DSL must be seen as part of a continuing pattern in California of
sending more and more convicted felons to prison and to jail. This pattern might
have continued past July 1, 1977 even without the DSL. On the other hand, the DSL
may have extended this trend and stabilized it at a higher level than would otherwise have occurred.
There are a number of possible reasons for the toughening of sentencing practices. During the 1970s public support for tougher "law and order" was demonstrated by the passage of statewide initiatives on the death penalty. Also, a number
ofincumbent Superior Court judges have lost elections after campaigns attacking
their "lenient" sentencing practices. The legislature reacted to this public mood by
adopting several mandatory prison sentencing laws and
modifying the Probation Subsidy Act, removing incentives to utilize probation and local jail for certain
offenses. Even when prison is not mandated, judges are aware of the public and
legislative interest in punishing convicted felons with incarceration.
Several features of the DSL may have magnified the effect ofthis trend toward
tougher sentencing. The DSL requires judges to provide reasons for their decisions.
This greater public accessibility under the DSL makes it easier for the media and
interested citizens to monitor judicial sentences, thereby increasing the political
risks from lenient sentencing. Also, under the DSL, judges can set a limited prison
term for felons convicted of relatively non-serious crimes without
possibility
that a parole board will inappropriately extend their terms. Finally, limiting parole
length to one year under the initial law apparently encouraged defendants to accept
short prison terms rather than go to the county jail or the California Rehabilitation
Center (for civilly committed drug addicts) which carried longer probation or
parole terms. 54

Sentence Lengths
While there is a clear increase in the number of felons being sentenced to prison
at this time, comparisons of the length oftime served in
ISL
DSL
are difficult to make and interpret.
sentence lengths under ISL
from year to year, depending on Adult
policies
5). Second,
length of a DSL sentence depends on the amount of good time credit received by
an inmate. While most inmates appear to be earning most of
credits, the
Department of Corrections does not yet have hard evidence about good time.
Moreover, Department of Corrections and Community Release Board policies on
good time could change sharply, affecting the overall lengths of terms. Recognizing
these limitations, we examine current terms and then estimate the effects of SB
709, which increased penalties for serious offenders.
54 Parole has now been lengthened to a possible three years. If parole considerations were important
explanations of the increased prison rate, we would expect to see a drop in the prison rate.
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Data provided by the Department of Corrections suggest that at least initially
under the DSL (i.e., before AB 709 had an impact) prison terms were shorter than
terms served under the ISL. Table 5 lists the median term served for inmates
released to parole from 1970 to 1977, as well as the median length of terms imposed
by courts through June 30, 1979, under the DSL.
The imposed DSL sentences are slightly longer than previous ISL terms. However, to be comparable to data on lengths of prison terms under the ISL, those DSL
sentences must be reduced to reflect credit for time served in local jails (a median
of three months) and credit for good time, which can be up to one-third of the
imposed sentence. As Table 5 reflects, the median time served in prison for inmates
receiving DSL sentences during the first years of the law will be between 21 and
33 months. Since the Department of Corrections reports that most inmates are

Table 5
COMPARISON OF ISLAND DSL SENTENCE LENGTHS FOR MALE FELONS
(In Months)
ISL
Year

Median ISL
Prison Term

Number Released
to First Parole

36
36
32
30
35
39
34
30
26

5007
6261
4914
2939
2694
6918
5430
6734
6726

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978a

DSL

Year

Imposed
Sentenceb
(Median)

1977-78
1978-79

36
36

Actual
Term
(Median)c

Number
Sentenced

21-33
21-33

2827
6590

SOURCES: California Department of Corrections, Program
Analysis and Recommendations, April 1, 1978, Appendix I and
Memorandum, "Two Years Experience Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act, July 1977-June 1979," December 14, 1979.
al978 releases include 205 inmates serving DSL sentences and
43 serving both ISL and DSL sentences.
bMedian length of prison sentence imposed by the court.
cRange of prison term that could actually be served. Minimum
reflects credit for time in jail before delivery to prison (3
months) and one-third reduction for good time; maximum reflects
no good time credit.
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receiving most of their good time, the median will be closer to the low end of this
range.
Thus the DSL appears to have reduced the average length of California prison
terms from their levels of the past nine years, but the significance of this is clouded.
Shorter prison terms under the DSL may reflect only the increased rate of incarceration. Under the DSL a larger proportion of felons sentenced to prison have been
convicted of property crimes that carry shorter sentences. Their greater numbers
would bring down the average, even if term lengths stayed the same for each
conviction offense.
If the DSL did shorten the lengths of terms, we should see a reduction for
specific conviction offenses. Other Department of Corrections data can be used in
comparing ISLand DSL terms for inmates convicted of robbery (Table 6), burglary
(Table 7), and assault (Table 8). Again assuming that inmates receive most of their
good time, these data show a substantial reduction in the length of prison terms for
burglary. However, the data suggest only a slight reduction in the initial DSL
sentences for violent crimes. Initial DSL prison terms for robbery were slightly
shorter than ISL terms of inmates released in 1977, and they were about the same
as ISL terms for 1978 releasees. Initial DSL term lengths for inmates convicted of

Table 6
CoMPARISON OF ISL AND DSL MEDIAN LENGTH
TERMS FOR RoBBERY
(In Months)

Year
1975
1976
1977
1978

1st Degree
Robbery
with Firearm

1st Degree
Robbery

2nd Degree
Robbery

All Robbery

48.5 (190)
45
(220)

45 (lOOl)c
39 (818)
35 (772)
34 (664)

38
30
29
27

29-44 (756)
29-45 (1524)

(565)
(417)
(411)
(380)

SOURCES: California Prisoners 1975, Table 33A; California Prisoners, 1976, Table 33A; Number and Time Served
in Prison before First Parole, Male Felons Paroled 1977
and 1978, MIS March 9, 1979; California Prisoners 1976,
Table 47A and Two Years Experience Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act, July 1977-June 1979 Summary Statistics
Department of Corrections, Sacramento, CA., Dec, 14,
1979.
aLength of term served for inmates released that year.
bRange of prison term that could actually be served for
inmates sentenced that year. Minimum reflects credit for
time in jail before delivery to prison (3 months) and onethird reduction for good time; maximum reflects no good
time credit.
cNumber of inmates released or sentenced indicated in
parentheses,
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OF

AND

MEDIAN LENGTH

TERMS FOR BuRGLARY

(In Months)
ISLa
Year

1st Degree

1975
1976
1977
1978

43
34
31
29

~---~--

( 213) c
(17 5)
(243)
(260)

2nd Degree

All Burglary

31 (961)
24 (782)
22 (1002)
19 (1249)

13-21 (597)
13-21 ( 1283)

~~~---··--------

SOURCES:

See Table 6.

aLength of term served for inmates released that year.
bRange of prison term that could actually
be served for inmates sentenced that year,
Minimum reflects credit for time in jail before delivery to prison (3 months) and onethird reduction for good time; maximum reflects no good time credit.
of inmates released or sentenced
indicated in parentheses.

Table 8
AND DSL MEDIAN
FOR AssAULT

(In Months)

Year
1975
1976
1977
1978

Assault
With
Firearm

Assault
Without
Firearm

40 (35)
3 7 (52)

41
34
33
29

SOURCES:

(455)c
(324)
(36 7
(376)

All ADW's

21-33 (312)
29-45 (683)

See Table 6.

of term served for inmates released that year.
of prison term that could actually be served for inmates sentenced that
year. ~linimum reflects credit for time
in jail before delivery to prison (_3
months} and one-third reduction for good
time; maximum reflects no good time
credit.
of inmates released or sentenced indicated in parentheses,

29

terms.
length of
of short
offenses would likely
most recent years under the ISL.
effect of the
on term lengths from
uu"UL>Jv•

above even the longest
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SB 709 will mean longer sentences for many felons sentenced after January 1,
1979. By our estimates, one-third of the convicted robbers will serve at least eight
months longer than robbers with DSL sentences before SB 709. Almost two-thirds
of the convicted burglars will serve an extra eight months, and another quarter will
serve an extra sixteen months. Half of the rapists will serve an extra sixteen
months, with another third serving at least 24 months longer.
The resulting median sentences will be greater than DSL sentences before SB
709, but they will not be appreciably different from the ISL terms of inmates
released in 1977 (Table 9). If felons earn all of their good time, median sentences
for robbery and burglary will still be less after SB 709 than 1977 ISL terms. The
median sentences for rape, with the greatest increase under SB 709, would be
one-half year longer than 1977 ISL terms even if a convicted rapist earned all of
his good time.
These comparisons of medians do not show the biggest effects of SB 709: increases in the lengths of extreme terms, felons who receive particularly long prison
sentences. 59 As evidence about extreme cases, Table 9 indicates the mean of
sentences under present sentencing practices and our estimates of the mean
sentences under SB 709. The greater increase in means than medians under SB 709
shows that the amendment will have a substantial impact on the longest sentences.

Sentence Decisions
Table 10 indicates judicial decisions to sentence on the lower, middle, or upper
base term for a variety of conviction offenses and groups of offenses. The table,
derived from data reported by the Judicial Council for the period from July 1, 1977
to September 30, 1978,60 indicates that across all sentences judges are most likely
to impose the middle term. Failing this, judges are substantially more likely to
impose the upper rather than the lower term. The use of upper terms is particularly
strong for crimes against persons, where judges are twice as likely to sentence
defendants under the upper than the lower term. For sex offenses judges are almost
four times as likely to choose the upper rather than the lower term; for robbery
cases the upper term is almost three times as likely to be chosen. Among property
and drug offenses judges are more likely to select the middle term. For theft and
drug offenses they use the upper and lower term about equally often.
In contrast, the Judicial Council's sentencing practice data reflect narrower use
of the DSL provisions for adding enhancements to sentences and for imposing
consecutive sentences. As Table 11 indicates, the only enhancements that are used
frequently are those dealing with arming and weapon use. Prosecutors and judges
appear to be making thorough use of weapon enhancements for robbery. For 60
percent of robbery cases the prosecution pled and proved either an arming allegation (P.C. 12022) or use allegation (P.C. 12022.5). Together, weapon enhancements
under one of these provisions are imposed in 50 percent of the robbery cases. For
these more severe upper terms. As a result there will be fewer upper term sentences, and our estimates
of increased sentences under SB 709 will be somewhat overstated. Thus, we probably overestimate the
mean and perhaps the median sentences after SB 709.
59
Medians do not fully reflect the greatest increases in SB 709 sentences for upper terms since they
show changes only for inmates at the middle of the distribution.
6
°California Judicial Council, Sentencing Practices Quarterly, Nos. 1-5.

DSL
DSL

Robbery

ISL
DSL
DSL

and

1979.
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Table 10
JUDICIAL SENTENCING DECISIONS AND
IMPOSITION OF BASE TERMS

Percentage of
Sentences in
Offense

Lower
Term

Middle
Term

Upper
Term

All personal crimes
Homicide
Assault
Sex crimes
Robbery

13
18
16
10
11

57
53
58
52
58

31
29
26
37
30

All property crimes
Burglary
Theft

15
14
19

64
63
62

22
23
19

Drug crimes

20

61

19

All crimes

15

60

25

SOURCE:

California Judicial Council,
Sentencing Practices
, Nos. 2-5,
July 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978.

The more severe enhancement for a prior prison term
a violent crime under
P.C. 667.5a is rarely pled and proven, although the Judicial Council data for this
enhancement cannot be interpreted precisely. There appear to be no substantial
differences between personal and property crimes in the imposition of enhancements for priors. 62
There is relatively little use of the great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement.
Overall it has been imposed in only about 2 percent of the
sentence
cases.
Finally, approximately 25 percent of all determinate sentence cases
sentencing for multiple counts. Consecutive sentences are imposed in 40 percent of
multiple count cases or in 10 percent of all cases. The imposition of consecutive
sentences is somewhat higher in personal crimes; consecutive sentences were imposed in 14 percent of all
crimes and in 16 percent ofthe personal crime
of robbery.
Our interviews with participants in
criminal justice system suggest that
plea bargaining practices may be an important factor influencing the
imposition of enhancements. Almost all participants in the judicial process indicate
that defendants now appear to be more willing to
a prison term as part of
the sentence bargain. As part of the bargain for a prison term, prosecutors will
frequently drop an enhancement for a
record.
6
2'fhere may be several reasons for the minimal use of prior record to enhance
sentences.
"Documentation of prior
is often absent;
Prosecutors report that prior record is "hard to
course of a case-long after filing. Prosecutorial
prosecutors may learn of priors only during
practices may also discourage use of prior enhancements. The establishment of a prior requires a search
for and introduction of evidence that is unlike evidence usually found in criminal cases. Instead of
physical evidence or witness testimony, the enhancement for a prior requires the search for and
establishment of a "business record," evidentiary procedures on which prosecutors may have little
experience or interest. Perhaps for these reasons, enhancements for priors may be the charge most
likely to be negotiated away to obtain a defendant's plea.

....
C;:J

Table 11
PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH IMPOSITION OF ENHANCEMENTS
-~-

Arming
(12022)
Principal
Offense

Total
Cases

Pled &
Proved

Robbery

1743

24%

Personal,
other than
robbery

1638

11

Personal,
including
robbery

3381

Property
All cases
SOURCE:

Imposed

Use
(12022. 5)
Pled &
Proved
Imposed

Great Bodily
Injury
. (12022. 7)
Pled &
Proved
Imposed

Prior Prison
(667.5b)
Pled &
Proved
Imposed

Multiple
Charges

Consecutive

Concurrent

8%

37%

16%

13%

36/~

31%

5%

4%

10%

8

23

19

3

3

7

4

31

12

12

18

14

30

25

4

3

9

6

34

14

13

3151

1

1

1

•5

.5

10

7

19

8

9

7787

9

7

13

2

2

8

6

25

10

11

19%

California Judicial Council,

.5
11

-

Practices

Nos. 2-5, July 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978.
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Disparity in Sentencing
Equitable sentencing was a principal goal of the DSL. The law sought to avoid
the previously great differences in sentences for defendants who committed similar
crimes. The elaborate sentencing structure established by the DSL attempts to
prevent great variation in sentences. Also, the DSL added a new review procedure,
the disparate sentence review, to monitor and reduce unwarranted variability in
judicial sentencing practices. Under that procedure the California Community Release Board is to review all prison sentences within one year of their commencement to discover sentences that are disparate. Judges will be notified of cases that
received shorter or longer sentences than comparable cases, or cases that received
prison terms when comparable cases rarely received such terms. Sentences that are
found to be more severe than similar cases will be returned to the sentencing judge
with a motion for a recall and resentencing.
The disparate sentence review, by an administrative board reviewing judicial
sentencing practices, is a unique procedure for providing equitable sentencing. The
Community Release Board plans empirically based simulations of each of the sentencing decisions made by judges for choices such as selection of base terms, enhancements, and probation versus prison.sa The review process has not been fully
implemented at the time of this report. Rather, the Board has conducted a series
of limited "interim" reviews. For the first 725 cases received between July and
December 1977, the Board found no sentences that were disparately long.
An Abt Associates study suggests that the DSL has reduced the overall variability in the lengths of prison terms. 64 The range for the middle 50 percent of all DSL
prison terms is 1.5 years compared to 2 years for the ISL years from 1968 to 1975.
For burglary, the middle 50 percent range is one-half that of the ISL years.
Before the DSL, disparity in the rate of prison commitments per 100,000 population varied between geographical areas of California, with less populated areas
sending a greater proportion of convicted felons to prison than more populated
areas (see Table 12). Recent data indicated that this geographic variability in prison
commitment rates continues but that highly populated areas of the state now have
commitment rates more comparable to those of lower population areas. Commitment rates have gone up in most areas of the state, but this increase is greater in
the most populous counties. Among the many factors that may account for geographical differences in commitment rates are population differences, differences
in arrest and prosecutorial policies, differential impacts of mandatory sentencing,
and changes in state policies, including fiscal limitation (Proposition 13) and modification of the local reimbursement formula in the Probation Subsidy Act.
A striking change in imprisonment rates between the pre- and post-DSL periods
was the atypically rapid increase in rates for San Francisco and Alameda counties.
While the commitment rate per 100,000 population increased from 30 to 39 statewide, the rate for San Francisco went up from 50 to 84 and for Alameda from 25
to 46.
63 See Gelman et al. (1977). For each prison case and a sample of probation cases, the Board has
collected information bearing on matters involved in the Judicial Council's Sentencing Rules. Information is coded from the abstract of judgment, charging documents, Bureau of Identification "rap sheet,"
probation officers' reports, the reporter's transcript of proceedings at the time of sentencing, and any
other documents submitted for use in sentencing. Data will be collected for over 10,000 cases per year.
64 Ku (1979).
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Table 12
CALIFORNIA PRISON RATE PER

100,000

RESIDENTS,

BY CouNTIES

Counties

Prison Ratea
1976
1978

So. California
Los Angeles County
9 others

25.08
27.87
22.47

37.59
39.05
35.94

San Francisco Bay
Alameda
San Francisco
7 others

29.34
24.95
50.22
26.43

39,41
46.01
83.65
28.11

Balance of state
10 Sacramento Valley Counties
7 San Joaquin Valley Counties
22 others

37.84
40.94
37.45
34.25

44.83
43.29
51.43
37.05

30.03

39.26

State total
SOURCE:

California Department of Corrections.

~er 100,000 residents.

Finally, the DSL and its several amendments have created the basis for systematic differences in sentences among defendants who committed their crimes at
different times. Provisions for retroactive application of determinate sentences
attempted to eliminate the temporal disparity between offenders who committed
crimes prior to the July 1, 1977 effective date of the DSL and those who committed
crimes after that date. However, amendments to the DSL only apply to offenders
who committed the act after the effective dates ofthe amending legislation. Thus,
the amendments have created the basis for temporal disparities in sentences.

CORRECTIONAL PROCESS
Although the DSL was directed primarily at the sentencing process, the law has
also had important effects on the correctional process. The law modified the term
of parole and the length of parole revocation and made a number of changes in
prison disciplinary procedures. The law also created "good time," a procedure that
was unnecessary with indeterminate sentences. The greatest impacts of the DSL,
however, have certainly been indirect, resulting from changes in the sentencing
been the change in prison population.
process. Of these, the most

Prison Population

As noted earlier, there has been a sharp increase in the commitment rate to
prison. The immediate effect on prison population was mitigated both by the sur-
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5-California male prison population-sources of entry and exit

powers between 1968 and 1977, 70 and concerns about it policy were certainly
instrumental in the adoption of the DSL. However, the DSL virtually eliminated
the use of parole releases to reduce prison population. 71 There simply is no relief
valve for reducing overcrowded prison conditions.
Figure 5 also indicates why California prisons will continue to face a problem
of growing population. As we have considered, in contrast to the stable pattern in
judicial sentencing practices for the previous 15 years, the rate of prison sentences
has grown steadily from 1972 through 1978. The number of male felons sent to
prison per year doubled during this period. Now, the DSL appears to have contributed to the substantially greater, apparently stable increase ofprison sentences. 72
This increase, together with the elimination of the relief valve provided by the
70
Should prison release decisions have been made on the basis of prison population constraints rather
than on a consideration ofthe effects of released inmates on the free population? Did alternating periods
of liberal and constricted parole release create intolerable disparities between inmates entering prison
at different times?
71
With determinate sentencing, the Community Release Board now has only limited power to release
prison inmates, i.e., the 15 to 20 percent of prison inmates serving life sentences.
72Increasing judicial use of imprisonment as a sentence for felons predated adoption of the DSL.
Nevertheless, the DSL and the numerous mandatory sentencing laws adopted in recent years have
contributed to the growth in prison sentences and have probably institutionalized those practices at a
stable pattern in which prison sentences may be double the rate of previous years.

Adult Authority, will produce continued
prison population. The Department
necessary double ceiling. Depending on one's
problem now or will face it in the near future. 73
The Department has projected that its male felon
exceed the single cell capacity of its institutions by 9,000 in
a building program to house 4,000 male and 400 female inmates in new institutions
not exceeding 450 in capacity. The cost of construction is estimated at
with operating expenses over the first 10 years anticipated at
the legislature has approved planning, design, and site
new institutions, it has not yet provided construction money.
New prison construction has been opposed by a coalition
church groups. 75 They offer a number of arguments about why new "''''"'r"'
unnecessary:
First, California prison sentences are too high compared to the national average and other countries-they should be reduced.
Second, as a related argument, increasing the prison population does not
crime. Despite both of these contentions, however, the legislature has
increased the length of sentences.
Third, critics of prison construction argue that the prison
cline by the time new prisons are open, in part because of a
population of high-crime prone young men. But projections over
do not suggest that demographic trends will produce a "'"""'"~""'
California prison populations. Because of the
demographers project that any decrease in the
and delayed in California. Persons between the ages of 18 and
largest group of migrants into California. As a result, state
for 18- to 35-year-old men show an increase of 15
1985, at the same time that the passing of the 1950s
the number of men in this age group in most other states.
35-year-old men in these years will likely have a
Americans and blacks who have higher rates of
73
At the present time, there may be some uncertainty about whether the
exceeds its capacity. The Department of Corrections has space available in muuu1wu
it has deactivated a large facility at San Luis Obispo and several camps.
all of these restrictions on bed space: High security risk inmates cannot be
and also inmates attempt to avoid the California Correctional Center at Susanville, a u w u m u m
the deactivated facility at San Luis Obispo is a severe fire hazard,
to fire mspe(:tOJrs
camps were given to and are now productively used
other state
and, even
available, their minimum security status would not
the
present
74 California Department of Corrections, Program
75 Groups opposing added prison construction include the American
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the American Civil Liberties
neys for Criminal Justice.
76
The 18-35 age population is projected to decline 6 percent ""'""'""'
decline by less than 1 percent between 1995 and 2000.
Counties 1975-2000, Series E-150, Department of Finance, December
California. Recent discussions with state officials responsible for l-'VJl-'"''""'v" "'"'""''''""'"
that immigration of persons between 18 and 35 years of age is
77 0ur rejection of these arguments does not mean that we agree with
that we accept that minority young men should be imprisoned at

cited

Ku (1979).
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Fig. 6-Prison disciplinary incidents in California

Perhaps of greater importance, the substantial growth in prison population engendered by the DSL may substantially aggravate problems of prison discipline.
Figure 6 does not show any clear effects of the DSL on prison
In 1978,
under the DSL, the incidence of disciplinary events has increased over
level of
1977; however, this increase is less than has occurred in the previous two years.
Informal discussions with prison officials, again, provides ambiguous information.
Some officials believe that the loss of the Adult Authority "stick"
greater due
process protection have given
inmates substantially more independence,
aggravating disciplinary problems. Other observers, both inside
outside the
Department of Corrections, question whether the parole-release power of the Adult
Authority was ever an effective device for controlling inmates. 79
Provisions for good time were added at the request of the Department of
Corrections because of fear that loss of Adult Authority powers would make it
harder to control inmate behavior. Corrections first reported relatively light use of
the provisions of the DSL permitting loss of good time. The procedures for remov7
91'hey suggest that both before and after the DSL, the Department of Corrections used a range of
informal punishments to control inmate behavior. Prison officials can impose light punishments, such
as weekend or holiday lockup, short-term loss of privileges, or extra work for minor rule violations. For
serious rule violations, officials generally use segregation,
change, isolation, or transfer
to less desirable institutions.

42

time are cumbersome, and Corrections personnel were still interpreting
ambiguous language used in the DSL to authorize loss of time. Recent comments
indicate that the denial of good time is increasing. Inmates we interviewed generally perceive denial of good time as a potent sanction. Although denial of good time
might currently be used sparingly, it is another among many threats that can be
used by prison authorities to impose discipline.
Some Department of Corrections staff and some inmates wonder whether the
DSL's elaborate due process provisions for removing good time have created
greater distance between inmates and Correctional staff and eliminated informal
procedures for resolving inmate disputes. For example, in the past some fights
between inmates were resolved by having inmates confront each other under supervision of prison staff. Now, with hearings, witnesses, and so on, these informal
procedures have been forgone and antagonisms that lead to fights may be hardened
rather than resolved.

Prison Treatment Programs
Some interviewees said they believed that the DSL specification of punishment
as the purpose of imprisonment and the elimination of Adult Authority incentives
and direction would cause many treatment programs to be curtailed or eliminated.
However, in the view of Corrections officials the legislature did not intend to
eliminate these programs. The legislature has, in fact, increased amounts budgeted
for various treatment and education programs (see Table 13). This annual budget
increase, together with the DSL provision of good time for program participation,
may indicate that the legislature continues to recognize the potential value of
treatment programs.

Table 13
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES AND BUDGET FOR
INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS,

1977-78

TO

1979-80

(in $ million)

Program

1977-78
Actual
Expenditures

Psychiatric services
Counseling services
Academic education
Vocational education
Leisure time
Religion

5.5
10.7
5.0
5.6
1.0
0.9

5.5
9.9
5.4
5.7
1.0
0.9

7.0
12.2
6.7
6.7
1.1
1.0

Treatment totala

28.7

28.2

34.8

SOURCE:

19 78-79
Actual
Expenditures

Governors Budget 1979-80 and 1980-81

aTotals do not add due to rounding.

1979-80
Estimated
Expenditures

The DSL has also had
various prison treatment programs. Department of
the level of participation in education and other treatment programs
slightly after the effective date of the statute, but has subsequently
previous level. Participation in vocational education programs remained at 13
percent of the inmate population for the year beginning July 1, 1977, the same rate
as the prior fiscal year. 80 We do not have comparative figures for academic
education, but 28.6 percent of the inmate population participated in academic
1978. 81
programs during the second quarter
The DSL probably affected inmates' attitudes and reasons for participation in
programs. Instructors in education programs report that inmates are more motivated to take courses when they see them as benefiting themselves on release, not
just satisfying the suggestions or expectations of the Adult Authority. As a
the education program has shifted away from basic high school education toward
skills programs to aid inmates in coping after their release. Some correctional
report observing that inmates are likely to plan their time constructively.
suggest that inmates generally do little to plan their time on a
for
only begin seriously considering their
nears. This suggests that an early time fix

Retroactive Application of the DSL
The DSL required the Community
date
ed under provision of the DSL for all uuua""""
release date could be extended by the
criminal history met one of five conditions set out in the DSL. A
sentence could only be extended after an extended term hearing.
given notice of such hearings and were
by counsel.
The Board screened about 18,000 cases for potential extended term
between August 5, 1977 and September 12, 1978.8' Approximately 15,000 cases were
given the retroactive DSL date calculated under the mechanical formula
in the statute without an extended term hearing. Cases identified as potentially
appropriate for extended terms were scheduled for hearings upon agreement
two members of the Board. Extended term hearings were scheduled for 3043
inmates. Of cases scheduled for extended term hearings, 2057 or 68 percent the
scheduled cases received extended terms. "Average" term extensions ranged
between two and three years for different offenses. Maximum extensions greatly
exceeded these averages. Table 14 indicates the average and maximum term
extension for seven conviction offenses.
Interviewed Community Release Board members and staff involved in retroactive application of the law said they would have preferred either that the law had
not been retroactively applied or that the Community Release Board had
given general guidelines rather than "mechanistic" rules to calculate terms. Most
80

Report of the California Department of Corrections, "Vocational Education," January 1979.
Department of Corrections, Program and Facilities Planning
March 1979.
82
The method for calculating this date is specified in the DSL and is based on
middle term
among an inmate's conviction offenses, plus applicable enhancements, if any.
8 '3Data were obtained from internal Community Release Board memoranda dated March 2, 1978;
June 12, 1978; and October 20, 1978.
81 California
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Table 14
ExTENDED TERMS FOR SEVEN CONVICTION 0FFENSESa

Conviction Offense
Murder, second degree
Manslaughter
Kidnapping
Robbery, first degree
Assault
Rape
Burglary, first degree

Number
of Cases

Average
Enhancement
(mo)

Longest
Enhancement
(mo)

221
140
69
562
159
311
122

34
23
34
33
23
30
23

192
120
244
228
120
144
132

~erived from internal Community Release Board memoranda dated March 2, 1978; June 12, 1978; and October 20,
1978.

other interviewed observers concluded that the Board administered a difficult task
as well as could be expected. However, interviewed inmates were highly critical of
the Board's extended term hearings. 84
Among those inmates released under retroactive provisions were about 100
offenders transferred from state prisons to Atascadero State Hospital because they
were found to be mentally ill. These inmates had served an average 3.8 years
beyond the discharge date computed by the Community Release Board under the
DSL. Many had been convicted of serious crimes including murder, manslaughter,
first degree robbery, assault, rape, or kidnapping. These inmates were released
either on parole or directly to the community.
The Community Release Board followed the behavior of those released for
several months and concluded that their arrest and recommitment experience was
no greater than that of other offenders with similar records released from institutions, although some had exhibited "bizarre" behavior. Preliminary review of data
supplied by the Department of Justice, which followed up on those released for one
year, suggests that their post-release behavior may not be significantly different
from that of other paroled prisoners. Forty-six percent had no subsequent criminal
history during a one-year follow-up period compared to between 40 to 46 percent
of parolees not designated mentally disordered violent offenders who remained
"clean" in the years 1973 through 1977.85
A similar DOJ follow-up of mentally violent offenders released from the De84
Inmate objections were probably intensified by the Board's policy of notification about retroactive
sentences. The Board first notified all inmates of their release date mechanically calculated under
provisions of the DSL. Inmates scheduled for extended term hearings were notified of the hearings after
receiving this mechanically determined date. Thus, many inmates felt that the Board had been twofaced in first "giving," then extending the retroactive DSL date.
85
Forty-three of91 offenders released from Atascadero had no arrests or parole violations. Data were
not provided for six additional released prisoners who died after release, several of whom committed
suicide. If all the deaths are considered as resulting from subsequent criminal activity, then 42 percent
rather than 46 percent had no subsequent criminal history. For data on parole outcomes, see Outcome
for Male Felons Released to California Parole from 1973 through 1977, Sacramento Research Office
of California Department of Corrections, October 31, 1978.

ries.

returns. The length of the
in 1975,
median pre-DSL
months.

on parole, the number of parolees was substanand December 31, 1978, the felon parole
14,557 to 9,997. During the first year of the
to have declined. Parole caseloads re-

those

purpose of parole and
sentenced. Since
parole population has steadily
August 1979, a 16.5 percent

supervision, the Community Release
exercise of its authority to directly
prisoners approved for discharge were
(about
and parole release groups (about
months and one year based on their
Through this study the Board intends
in the discharge review and to determine
more extensively employed in the future.

administrative expenses. The changeestimated one-time expenses for the
of$1.5 million for development
records and counseling practices. 89
the related extended term hearings also
Actual expenditures for the
of Corrections, $1,200,000.
$875,000; Department of Corrections,

Community Release Board during its
$2 million more than for the Adult
Paroles in 1976-1977. However, more than half of the eXJJerlm:mr
retroactive application of the law and the new
Continuing administrative expenses for all state
range upward of$5 million per year. New continuing expenses
Release Board above those pf the Adult Authority
and Paroles appear to range between $500,000 and
additional administrative costs on counties for court processes
Public Defender and District Attorney costs for
elaborate P&S reports, and court costs for calculating "'""-J.C<=HLJu15
hearings.
State law provides that these costs are reimbursable to
only Orange County has filed a claim for reimbursement.
County's claim for reimbursable expenses to other counties
court-related costs at around $4 million. 92 These additional u'"'''"""'""'"~
are modest in comparison with annual court, prosecutor,
$450 million to $500 million.
The major element of additional DSL cost arises from
tions. SB 42 would probably have slightly reduced
a potential savings wiped out by the lengthened terms
Additional operating expenses for the increased
were projected at almost $150 million between
Department of Corrections also projected a
million. 94
As we discussed above, prison population was
Therefore, the additional cost of the DSL and its cuLn:-uuuJvU
to be substantially less than the figure of $300 lHL<uuu "''''"uaccu
accommodate its increasing population.
ing penalties will further increase correctional costs.
Initial cost savings projected for the
been overwhelmed by the larger prison
under SB 1057. The Department of
penses of $3 million annually.

cot.aUHi:>JJv0

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The related issues of prison conditions and "~t:•"U"~v"
ing policy are central to our proposals
91

$600,000 of this is for the disparate sentence review for fiscal
0range County filed a claim for $420,000 of which $256,000
be within its guidelines.
93The Department of Corrections estimated a $27.4 million
new prisoners per year. Since new prisoners are substantially
be reduced or eliminated.
94
The Department of Corrections estimated increased
million.
first year and additional parole expenses of
"Implementation of AB 476,"
31, 1976,
in Dick Howard
92
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Total is reconstruction,
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III. PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH

Our review of the California Criminal Justice System under the DSL identifies
several continuing issues that are critical to the success of the law:
e The legislature's decisions about sentencing policy and responses to increasing prison crowding and costs.
• Prison conditions under the DSL.
• Prosecutors' use of their extensive discretion under the DSL.

Research in these issues is central to describing the initial effects of the DSL
and to examining how California copes with major problems ofthe post-DSL period.
Research should be directed toward helping California policymakers cope with
these major problems and determining how well the law achieves its major objec. tives.
The remainder of this report describes existing research and our proposals for
further research, which includes studies of the central role of the legislature in
criminal sentencing; correctional programs and security; court implementation of
sentencing policy; and the effects of prosecutorial discretion.
In addition to these specific policy issues, many persons are interested in descriptions of criminal justice operations under the DSL. Particularly, policymakers
in other states would benefit from a thorough description of how California criminal justice agencies are adapting to determinate sentencing and to the specific
elements of California's DSL.

DESCRIPTION OF COURT AND CORRECTIONAL
PRACTICES
Two research projects currently under way to study court and correctional
practices under the DSL are being directed by Jay Casper at Stanford University
and Sheldon Messinger at the University of California, Berkeley. 95
Both studies are examining court processes under the DSL through interviews
with participants in selected jurisdictions and through direct observation of court
and negotiating practices in those jurisdictions. Together, the two studies should
provide somewhat independent descriptions of how judges, attorneys, and defendants perceive the available sentencing options, how they engage in plea and/ or
sentencing bargaining, and how participants otherwise use the elements of the new
law.
Messinger also plans to describe operations of the California prison system
under the DSL, basing his descriptions on interviews and observations carried out
in greater scope than those considered in the present report. That study should
provide more detailed consideration of the implementation of the DSL, the appar95
Messinger's research is part of a multi-state examination of determinate sentencing. Andrew von
Hirsch and Richard Sparks of Rutgers University are responsible for other aspects of this project.
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ently increased crowding, and the beginning effects of both on institutional order
and procedures. As part of the same research project, Elliot Studt will examine
operations of the Parole and Community Services Division of the Department of
Corrections and actions of the Community Release Board affecting parole supervision and revocation.
Similar descriptive research should thoroughly examine the legislature's actions affecting sentencing and prison capacity and operations. An appropriate
study oflegislative action affecting the DSL cannot be conducted within the financial or time constraints of either the present study or the Berkeley-Rutgers study.

PROJECT I: RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Critics have raised many questions about the appropriateness and implications
of selecting a legislature as the sentence-determining body. They have suggested
that the legislature will inevitably raise penalties in response to political pressures
and will be unable to maintain a reasonable balance between specified crimes and
punishments for them, or penalties for greater and lesser offenses. There is no
dispute that the legislature has ultimate responsibility for establishing a legal
framework for determining criminal penalties. This issue is related to the amount
of discretion that should be retained by the legislature or delegated to administrative agencies or the courts to decide pel)alties for specified crimes. While assertions
have been made about the implications of a greater legislative sentencing role, little
empirical research has been undertaken to examine in detail the actual behavior
of a legislature with determinate sentence responsibility. California offers a natural
experiment for examining the general issues of legislative determination of detailed sentencing policy.
A study of the California legislature is also important in understanding and
evaluating the state's DSL. Our review indicates that future legislative action in
adjusting sentences and dealing with prison costs and capacity are central to the
future of the DSL. Both of these research purposes suggest a study investigating
legislative decisionmaking about penalty measures, related budgetary issues, and
other measures affecting prison population.
The role of the legislature in sentencing should be studied over a period of
years, including the years before passage of the DSL, through the period of amendment and implementation of the law. This would provide a historic perspective to
the current legislative actions dealing with sentencing. The research period should
continue for at least several future years, during the critical period in which the
legislature must decide about prison construction while it continues to face pressure for increased penalty levels. During this time, it is likely that the legislature
will either have to provide funds for prison construction, modify sentencing policy
to reduce prison intake, establish an administrative agency to set prison times,
reintroduce indeterminacy, or establish a substantial program of non-prison alternatives for felons. If the legislature does not make effective choices using these
alternatives, basic decisions will then be made by intervening courts.
For each year during the studied period, the research should identify the major
criminal justice issues and proposed legislation. The study should

52

2.
ters.
3.

4.

had major impacts both
"""''"'""'"' ...""must work

ten

prisoner

may

ever the source.

80

81

82

81

82

83

83
84

84

85

85

86

86
87

1987 population
as percent of
current capacity
100%

100%

100%

111%
143%

112%
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119%
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112%
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144%
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140%

130",{,
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for prisons

Examination of correctional records
veys of inmates and staff about the un~n-<.•vu•oo
tion of stress and institutional difficulties,
inmates'
participation in work or programs,
the amount
surveys could also be used in the studies we propose
discipline under the DSL.

Research on Rehabilitation
Although the DSL redefined the purpose of prison to
than rehabilitation, California prisons continue to
educational, and voluntary programs intended in part to
Our interviews with correctional staff and inmates suggest
programs has changed under the DSL and that the reasons
inmates' participation in programs have also changed. Of
inmates and staff indicate that rehabilitation programs may
that rehabilitation is no longer a purpose for
more voluntary.
Given the change in purposes of the California prison ""''ralrn
of Corrections should have basic information with which to reassess
value of programs that it will continue to offer. J."''"c':u
of continuing programs both as assessed by inmates
inmates into society after prison.
Research should explicitly consider the cost
education, and voluntary programs involve
ment of Corrections. With growing prison populations
for expansion of programs and greater difficulty in uu~""'F>
to support them. Review of the costs and apparent benefits
plans to continue, expand, or reduce particular programs.
First, the research should catalog each of the programs
tution both before and after the DSL. The catalog NlU'u"u
programs, indicate the number and frequency
the demands that programs place on funds, prison space,
The research should survey both inmates and
tions about changes since the DSL, and
some programs the survey of inmates might be able to
The Rand Corporation as part of its 1978 survey
Rand survey obtained inmates' reasons for
programs and their assessment of them.
Research should also explore the value that programs
inmates' adjustment after prison. This could be
99'fhe offender survey was directed by Mark Peterson and examined sell-reJ"or·ts
before incarceration and correlates of criminal behavior. A
of correctional nrn="m
ed by Joan Petersilia in conjunction with the offen~r survey. report of
correctional programs is in preparation.

on

discretion. 102
Figure 8 indicates the two groups
levels under ISL and
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Time of sentencing
Time of crime
Before
August 1976 *

Prior to July 1, 1977

True ISL

August 1976-

After

July 1, 1977 t

July 1, 1977

Transition ISL

July 1, 1977 or later

.

Transition ISL
under DSL t

True DSL

DSL was passed in August 1976.

t Effective date of DSL was July 1, 1977.

t

Crimes committed before July 1, 1977 are given ISL sentences,
although sentenced after effective date of the DSL.

Fig. 8-Comparison of ISL and DSL cases

received different disposition under each sentencing system, and to establish
the length of DSL sentences and case features that account for differences in
sentence length. The Rand and Berkeley-Rutgers data are the only existing data
that can be used to compare the proportion of prison cases under ISLand DSL. No
other data separate DSL cases from ISL cases sentenced after July 1, 1977. However, both the Rand and Berkeley-Rutgers data sets lack the length of terms for
prisoners under ISL and thus provide no basis for comparing the length of prison
sentences under ISLand DSL.to6
The third and fourth sets shown in Table 16 are the OBTS 107 data maintained
by the Department of Justice and the Judicial Council data on sentencing practices.
The OBTS data indicate the prison rate under ISV 08 and the first transition period
from August 1976 to July 1, 1977. However, neither of these data sets provides
other information needed to compare ISL and DSL sentence lengths.
Department of Corrections data, the fifth source shown, provide the only basis
determining the actual length of prison terms. Good time and predelivery
credits must be subtracted from imposed sentences to compare the true length of
terms with ISL terms. Judicial Council data indicate preprison credits, but
only the Corrections data indicate good time credits.
sixth source is data currently collected by the Community Release Board
as part of its disparate sentence review. The Board collects all of the information
might be estimated from CDC data.
transaction system.
wsoBTS data also indicate the prison rate for the period from August 1976 to July 1, 1977.
UU<enaeNJaS(~Cl

Table 16
INFORMATION ABOUT SENTENCE LENGTHS FROM ExiSTING DATA SETS
1. Prison
Rate

Origin of
Data Set

LSL I IRAN I ISL/
DSL

2. Average

3. Detailed

Prison
Sentence

Information
Prison

I DSL llSL I TRAN llSL/1
DSL

Rand

X

Berkeley

"'~'"b'-~"-~

T!Uu'!l ISL/
DSL

5. Detailed
Information
Nqnprison

Sentence

IDSL I ISL I TR!II-ll

ISL/1

DSL

DSL

I ISL I TR!IN llSL/1

DSL

DSL

X

X

Comments
X

County

X

-+---+-----l----+-----j----+----

~

Department of
Corrections
Council

I

Average

Jail

X

- - - - - - - - - t ---+--1----.-

_luJ,i

DSL

!4.

AU counties
All felonies

Priur record

X

demo graph

c

LH1

Comhiued

-+---+--+-,--+---

---------- +---+--+-----,------+---+----+-

counties

All felonies
All felonies

X
Jlod rd

I

I

I

-----------+---+-----1-----+----+--+--

I

I

-+---1-----+--+-- -C-~--

I

I

I Prison-all

Nonpr ison-3

All felonies
lemental

X

X

Prison-all
Nonprison-J counties
ISL-3 counties
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cases. 109

most

court practices on
policy of just punishsentences actually imposed by courts reseriousness of offenses. Simple
ranges of sentences for various ofFigure
of 1978 for offenses

statistical analyses would
whether imposed sentences"
seriousness. These analyses could
different crimes, controlling for the
analyses could indicate whether cases in
more seriously, controlling for the

court actions and the underlycan analyzed to see if the length ofprison terms
true seriousness of cases, indicated by facts,
call for longer sentences under the
Release Board data could also establish
was created either by filing, bargaining
identification ofthe source of the problem would
the
sentencing structure.
VH1'-'••::u

of the California DSL. Because of the
the legislature should
provisions that affect sentencissue is particularly important since recent
may increase sentencing inequiattempts to promote equitable
court practices under the DSL and the
disparate sentence review on sentence
sentences must differ, both with regard
or
and the length of prison terms,
seriousness of crimes and, perhaps, an offender's backother, illegitimate differences in senprovides some limited specification
""'j'""c'u"'c", e.g., weapon use, prior prison record.
for the Superior Courtll 5 substantially
serve as legitimate bases for sentencing

to be as serious as 3, 4. 5 year term offenses that involve
to account for the statutory provisions that some
offenses (e.g., a great bodily injury enhance-

truth of factual statements in pre-sentence reports from
is reduced somewhat by the opportunity for both
mtr.rnnnh
to the P&S report during the sentenchearings.
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ll 9

Peterson and

(1980).

emalternatives to protect

'"'?'"'"'''""'

can examine in quite different ways the
intended

ine prosecutors' u~"'~"'o
tions. These studies
of filing, negotiating,
also be useful in
Rand is collecting uc,,a,Jc<Ou
County, and the
Rand data have
contain details
and prosecutor and court
collected by the Community
although somewhat more
Examination of prosecutorial
120
Robbery provides more sensitive comparison. SB 709 """"'"'"u
not the middle. Therefore, unlike for other crimes
decrease in imposition of upper terms, but little or
121
The Judicial Council will have statewide data
conviction offenses. However, their data do not indicate the
a non-prison sentence, the data do
indicate
122
See Section II.
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APPENDIX

DATA USED TO GENERATE

Table A.l
CALIFORNIA PRISON PoPULATION-SouRcEs
OF ENTRY AND EXIT

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1961
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

Male
Prison
Population

New
Court
Convictions

Net
Parole
Releases

17,237
17,093
19,232
21,03tl
20,384
22,262
22,136
21,893
22,666
22,904
23,504
22,350
20,460
16,952
16,470
19,167
21,283
16,598
17,459
16,667
20,172

5,146
5,426
5,701
5,842
5,863
5,030
4,983
5,626
5,169
4,872
4,667
4,496
4,426
4.472
4,272
4,839
5,081
5,433
6,463
7,065
8,753

2050
4155
2716
3197
4610
3365
3928
4509
3407
3697
3328
4809
4201
1747
2457
9038
4769
7328
6273

SOURCE: California Department of
Convictions,
and Facilities
Planning Report, March 15, 1979.
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